Commit: 4e1b717fd5a0a0a5462642aa3443fbab5265b28d - ffftp (git)

FFFTPのソースコードです。

Commit MetaInfo

• Révision: 4e1b717fd5a0a0a5462642aa3443fbab5265b28d (tree)
• l'heure: 2016-03-05 20:17:14
• Auteur: s_kawamoto <s_kawamoto@user...>
• Commiter: s_kawamoto

Message de Log

Update OpenSSL to 1.0.2g.

Change Summary

• modified: FFFTP_Eng_Release/FFFTP.exe
• modified: FFFTP_Eng_Release_64/FFFTP.exe
• modified: Release/FFFTP.exe
• modified: Release_64/FFFTP.exe
• modified: common.h
• modified: contrib/openssl/CHANGES
• modified: contrib/openssl/NEWS
• modified: contrib/openssl/README
• modified: contrib/openssl/include/openssl/bio.h
• modified: contrib/openssl/include/openssl/bn.h
• modified: contrib/openssl/include/openssl/crypto.h
• modified: contrib/openssl/include/openssl/dh.h
• modified: contrib/openssl/include/openssl/opensslconf.h
• modified: contrib/openssl/include/openssl/opensslv.h
• modified: contrib/openssl/include/openssl/srp.h
• modified: contrib/openssl/include/openssl/ssl.h
• modified: dist/amd64/libeay32.dll
• modified: dist/amd64/ssleay32.dll
• modified: dist/libeay32.dll
• modified: dist/ssleay32.dll
• modified: socketwrapper.c

Modification

Binary files a/FFFTP_Eng_Release/FFFTP.exe and b/FFFTP_Eng_Release/FFFTP.exe differ

Binary files a/FFFTP_Eng_Release_64/FFFTP.exe and b/FFFTP_Eng_Release_64/FFFTP.exe differ

Binary files a/Release/FFFTP.exe and b/Release/FFFTP.exe differ

Binary files a/Release_64/FFFTP.exe and b/Release_64/FFFTP.exe differ

--- a/common.h
+++ b/common.h
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
 // ソフトウェア自動更新
 // リリースバージョンはリリース予定年（10進数4桁）+月（2桁）+日（2桁）+通し番号（0スタート2桁）とする
 // 2014年7月31日中の30個目のリリースは2014073129
-#define RELEASE_VERSION_NUM		2016022000	/* リリースバージョン */
+#define RELEASE_VERSION_NUM		2016030500	/* リリースバージョン */
 
 
 // SourceForge.JPによるフォーク

--- a/contrib/openssl/CHANGES
+++ b/contrib/openssl/CHANGES
@@ -2,6 +2,138 @@
  OpenSSL CHANGES
  _______________
 
+ Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
+
+  * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+    Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not
+    provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.
+    [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+  * Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers.  SSLv2
+    is by default disabled at build-time.  Builds that are not configured with
+    "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2.  Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
+    users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method()
+    will need to explicitly call either of:
+
+        SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+    or
+        SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+
+    as appropriate.  Even if either of those is used, or the application
+    explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and
+    server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key
+    recovery have been removed.  Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT
+    ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
+    (CVE-2016-0800)
+    [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+  *) Fix a double-free in DSA code
+
+     A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
+     keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications
+     that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources.  This scenario is
+     considered rare.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using
+     libFuzzer.
+     (CVE-2016-0705)
+     [Stephen Henson]
+
+  *) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak.
+
+     Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly.
+
+     SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
+     In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
+     was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed
+     is configured.
+
+     Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
+     SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
+     also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
+     invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
+     credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
+     guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
+     that of a valid user.
+     (CVE-2016-0798)
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
+  *) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+
+     In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an
+     int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For
+     large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
+     memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data
+     field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values
+     of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|.
+     In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it
+     is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists
+     in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn
+     is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data.
+     This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
+
+     All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected
+     to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
+     arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
+     on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
+     consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
+     (CVE-2016-0797)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
+
+     The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
+     the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
+     string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
+
+     Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an
+     OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a
+     memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
+     the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
+     could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can
+     also occur.
+
+     The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
+     These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
+     is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
+     in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
+     functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
+     applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
+     untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
+     vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
+     as command line arguments.
+
+     Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
+     received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
+     trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken.
+     (CVE-2016-0799)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation
+
+     A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
+     the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery
+     of RSA keys.  The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on
+     an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
+     hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of
+     Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and
+     Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at
+     http://cachebleed.info.
+     (CVE-2016-0702)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
+  *) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default,
+     if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an
+     omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation
+     apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+     [Emilia Käsper]
+
  Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
 
   *) DH small subgroups
@@ -105,7 +237,7 @@
      [Emilia Käsper]
 
   *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
-     return an error
+     use a random seed, as already documented.
      [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <[e-mail]>]
 
  Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]

--- a/contrib/openssl/NEWS
+++ b/contrib/openssl/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,19 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2f and OpenSSL 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
+
+      o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+      o Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers
+        (CVE-2016-0800)
+      o Fix a double-free in DSA code (CVE-2016-0705)
+      o Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak
+        (CVE-2016-0798)
+      o Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+        (CVE-2016-0797)
+      o Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions (CVE-2016-0799)
+      o Fix side channel attack on modular exponentiation (CVE-2016-0702)
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2e and OpenSSL 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
 
       o DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701)

--- a/contrib/openssl/README
+++ b/contrib/openssl/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.2f 28 Jan 2016
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2g 1 Mar 2016
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson

--- a/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/bio.h
+++ b/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/bio.h
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo {
 # define BIO_get_conn_hostname(b)  BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,0)
 # define BIO_get_conn_port(b)      BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,1)
 # define BIO_get_conn_ip(b)               BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,2)
-# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,NULL)
 
 # define BIO_set_nbio(b,n)       BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL)
 
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi,
                         long argl, long ret);
 
 BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void);
-BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(void *buf, int len);
+BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len);
 BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void);
 BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_connect(void);
 BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void);

--- a/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/bn.h
+++ b/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/bn.h
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
 #ifndef HEADER_BN_H
 # define HEADER_BN_H
 
+# include <limits.h>
 # include <openssl/e_os2.h>
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
 #  include <stdio.h>            /* FILE */
@@ -721,8 +722,17 @@ const BIGNUM *BN_get0_nist_prime_521(void);
 
 /* library internal functions */
 
-# define bn_expand(a,bits) ((((((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)) <= (a)->dmax)?\
-        (a):bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2))
+# define bn_expand(a,bits) \
+    ( \
+        bits > (INT_MAX - BN_BITS2 + 1) ? \
+            NULL \
+        : \
+            (((bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) <= (a)->dmax) ? \
+                (a) \
+            : \
+                bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) \
+    )
+
 # define bn_wexpand(a,words) (((words) <= (a)->dmax)?(a):bn_expand2((a),(words)))
 BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int words);
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED

--- a/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/crypto.h
+++ b/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/crypto.h
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ void OPENSSL_init(void);
  * into a defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other
  * than to be non-zero.
  */
-int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const volatile void *a, const volatile void *b, size_t len);
 
 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
 /*

--- a/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/dh.h
+++ b/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/dh.h
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ struct dh_st {
 /* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
 # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL       0x01
 # define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE       0x02
-# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID         0x03
+# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID         0x04
 
 /*
  * primes p where (p-1)/2 is prime too are called "safe"; we define this for

--- a/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+++ b/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/opensslconf.h
@@ -41,12 +41,18 @@ extern "C" {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
 # define OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STORE
 # define OPENSSL_NO_STORE
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
 # define OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+# define OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+#endif
 
 #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
 
@@ -92,12 +98,18 @@ extern "C" {
 # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE) && !defined(NO_SSL_TRACE)
 #  define NO_SSL_TRACE
 # endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(NO_SSL2)
+#  define NO_SSL2
+# endif
 # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STORE) && !defined(NO_STORE)
 #  define NO_STORE
 # endif
 # if defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST) && !defined(NO_UNIT_TEST)
 #  define NO_UNIT_TEST
 # endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS) && !defined(NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS)
+#  define NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS
+# endif
 #endif
 
 /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */

--- a/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/opensslv.h
+++ b/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000206fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x1000207fL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2f-fips  28 Jan 2016"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2g-fips  1 Mar 2016"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2f  28 Jan 2016"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2g  1 Mar 2016"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 

--- a/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/srp.h
+++ b/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/srp.h
@@ -82,16 +82,21 @@ typedef struct SRP_gN_cache_st {
 DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache)
 
 typedef struct SRP_user_pwd_st {
+    /* Owned by us. */
     char *id;
     BIGNUM *s;
     BIGNUM *v;
+    /* Not owned by us. */
     const BIGNUM *g;
     const BIGNUM *N;
+    /* Owned by us. */
     char *info;
 } SRP_user_pwd;
 
 DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRP_user_pwd)
 
+void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd);
+
 typedef struct SRP_VBASE_st {
     STACK_OF(SRP_user_pwd) *users_pwd;
     STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache;
@@ -115,7 +120,12 @@ DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRP_gN)
 SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key);
 int SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb);
 int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file);
+
+/* This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user. */
 SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username);
+/* NOTE: unlike in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user, caller owns the returned pointer.*/
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username);
+
 char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
                           char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g);
 int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,

--- a/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/ssl.h
+++ b/contrib/openssl/include/openssl/ssl.h
@@ -2713,7 +2713,6 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK                       157
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER                     156
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER                    291
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_SHUTDOWN                              396
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES                           158
 # define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING                         159
 # define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN                         318

Binary files a/dist/amd64/libeay32.dll and b/dist/amd64/libeay32.dll differ

Binary files a/dist/amd64/ssleay32.dll and b/dist/amd64/ssleay32.dll differ

Binary files a/dist/libeay32.dll and b/dist/libeay32.dll differ

Binary files a/dist/ssleay32.dll and b/dist/ssleay32.dll differ

--- a/socketwrapper.c
+++ b/socketwrapper.c
@@ -153,15 +153,15 @@ BOOL LoadOpenSSL()
 #ifdef ENABLE_PROCESS_PROTECTION
 	// 同梱するOpenSSLのバージョンに合わせてSHA1ハッシュ値を変更すること
 #if defined(_M_IX86)
-	// ssleay32.dll 1.0.2f
-	RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\xB7\xA4\x25\x22\x73\x62\xC9\x0D\xAA\xBD\x1F\x11\x61\x16\x02\x8A\x5C\x23\xDE\x38");
-	// libeay32.dll 1.0.2f
-	RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\x89\xE8\x42\x0E\xDE\x75\x31\x94\xF3\xD0\x54\x02\xD1\x29\x89\x28\x89\x41\xDF\x19");
+	// ssleay32.dll 1.0.2g
+	RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\x96\x60\x94\xD8\x35\xB8\xAC\x1B\xEC\xCB\x45\xAD\x1B\x3E\x4C\x9F\xDC\x78\xA9\xDC");
+	// libeay32.dll 1.0.2g
+	RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\xBD\x91\xB9\x36\xC1\xC5\x65\x6D\x8F\xAA\xCF\x6F\x84\x8B\xC7\x77\x23\x8D\xE6\x2B");
 #elif defined(_M_AMD64)
-	// ssleay32.dll 1.0.2f
-	RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\xB0\x89\xBB\x7C\x7A\xC1\x4E\x00\xC6\x9B\xEC\x36\xDE\x6C\xB6\x1F\xBE\x46\x55\x0E");
-	// libeay32.dll 1.0.2f
-	RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\xC5\x59\x7B\x0C\x3C\xF6\x8E\xF8\x10\x18\x3D\x59\x8C\x47\x14\xCA\xB6\xD2\x58\x75");
+	// ssleay32.dll 1.0.2g
+	RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\xF8\x88\xEB\xC1\x2B\xE6\xE4\xFD\xFA\xCA\x9F\xAB\x2F\x46\x47\xC4\x56\x11\xF8\x21");
+	// libeay32.dll 1.0.2g
+	RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\x70\xAD\x36\x15\xB1\x2C\x82\xAF\xD4\x93\x17\xD4\x82\xC7\x15\x4B\x89\x86\xE3\xE6");
 #endif
 #endif
 	g_hOpenSSL = LoadLibrary("ssleay32.dll");